Un examen del verso final del Himno a Apolo de Calímaco dentro del marco de las teorías poéticas calimaqueas lleva a la conclusión de que la lectura Φθόνος es genuina, mientras que la variante φθόρος es una trivialización.

An analysis of the final line of Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo, conducted within the framework of the poet's literary theories, shows that the reading Φθόνος is genuine, whereas the variant φθόρος is a trivialization.

The final line in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo has been the subject of copious debate during the last centuries. Fortunately for us, most of the relevant material has been assembled by F. Williams, in his doctoral dissertation which was directed by me at my Classics Research Centre, University of London, so that I can now conveniently refer the readers to the monograph in question. As is well known, the problem consists in choosing between the variants Φθόνος or φθόρος in line 113. The editiones veteres, as Ernesti noted in his commentary ad loc., read

χαίρε ἀναξίος ὅ ὤκε Μῶμος, ἵν τὸ Φθόνος, ἐνθά νέοιτο

1 F. Williams, Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo (Oxford 1978) 96 ff.
but the variant Φθόνος was rejected by Ernesti, who judged φθόρος to be the correct one. Accordingly, Ernesti, following Bergler (cf. *Thes. Gr. Ling.*, s. v. φθόρος) printed

χαίρε ἄναξ ὦ δέ Μῶμος, ἵνα ὦ φθόρος, ἠθα νέοιτο.

and explained the line as meaning “Salve, rex. Momus autem in malam rem abeat”. According to Ernesti, that is to say, Callimachus expressed the wish that Μῶμος (personification of the unfair criticism levelled at him by his envious rivals) might die (“intereat Momus”): if we were to replace “pro morte invidiam” in line 113, i.e. if we were to read, in the said line, Φθόνος instead of φθόρος, the sense would be stupid (“insulse admodum”). The same view was taken by Spanhem, in his commentary *ad loc.* 3. According to him, Μῶμος, in line 113, was the same character (“idem”) as the personified Φθόνος whom we encounter in lines 105 ff. of the Hymn, where he is kicked away by Apollo. Therefore, so argued Spanhem, it would be tautological to write ὦ δέ Μῶμος, ἵνα ὦ Φθόνος, ἠθα νέοιτο in line 113: the correct variant, Spanhem maintained, in line 113 is φθόρος (not Φθόνος). In Spanhem’s opinion, Callimachus’ words in line 113 mean that he wishes Μῶμος, i.e. Envy (which, personified as Φθόνος, had already been kicked away by Apollo in lines 105 ff.) to “in penuicem abire”. Expressions involving phrases like ἔλθη φθόρον, ἐλθὼν φθόρον, ἔλθη φθοράν are used, in Greek, in order to wish someone dead (which notion subsumes the notion of becoming silent, insofar as the dead do not speak: material in Spanhem, *loc. cit.*, *σιγώσα, ἄφωνος*). These considerations demonstrate “abunde”, Spanhem concluded, that the variant Φθόνος was introduced “absurde omnino” into the place of the correct reading φθόρος in line 113. Since 1870, editors have -correctly, as we shall see- accepted the variant Φθόνος in line 113, for reasons clearly indicated by Williams, *loc. cit.*

Two articles have recently appeared, in which the textual problem contained in line 113 is discussed anew. C. Meillier, in a paper full of brilliant insights 4, does not reach a firm conclusion as to which of the two variants must be regarded as the genuine one. He correctly states (p. 80) that “rien dans l’état de la tradition ne permet...d’assurer qu’une leçon est meilleure que l’autre” (I shall revert to this point later); the criterion *utrum in alterum* which he accordingly tries to apply does not lead him to settle the question. On the one hand he writes that “la leçon Φθόνος offre un sens tout à fait satisfaisant” (p. 94), and that “le passage de Φθόνος à φθόρος peut se comprendre” as a trivialization, due to “la plume d’un Chrétien”, who identified “Phthoros” with the “Diable” (p. 93, n.36), but on the other hand he wonders whether φθόρος might well be “la lectio difficilior” (p. 80).

3 E. Spanhem(ius), *In Callimachi Hymnos Observationes* (Utrajecti 1697) 119 ff.

Meillier, in my opinion, is wrong when he invokes a "déplacement du rapport Phthonos/Momos en un nouveau rapport Phthoros/Momos" (p. 88) and when he, asserting that "Phthonos est réduit à Phthoros" (p. 90), postulates a "relation Phthonos-Phthoros" (p. 93): he is wrong because personified Phthonos and personified Momos are commonplace in the ancient world (cf. Roscher, *Lex. Mythol.*, s. v. Personificationen, 2167 s.), whereas, as far I know, the personification of φθόρος never existed in antiquity. In his own paper, J. Blomquist, developing the arguments used by Spanhem, asserts that the reading φθόρος is the correct one, in line 113, whereas the variant φθώνος is to be rejected. I shall now try to show that Blomquist's thesis is wrong.

First of all: Blomquist, following unquestioningly in Pfeiffer's footsteps, thinks that the variant φθώνος "can be dismissed as a scribal correction", because "the archetype had φθόρος" (p. 18). Such assertions by Blomquist are ungrounded, insofar as Dr. H. White and I have shown that Pfeiffer's views concerning the manuscript transmission of Callimachus' Hymns are devoid of any foundation (cf. lastly *CL* 6 [1990] 39 ff.). Since the reading φθώνος cannot be dismissed as a mere "scribal correction", it follows that the criterion called utrum in alterum or lectio difficilior is the only one that can serve to establish which of the two rival readings is the genuine one. Blomquist himself, admitting that "the textual transmission cannot help us to choose between the two readings" (ibid.), uses this criterion, only he misapplies it.

Schneider (*Callimachea*, 194 f.), whom Wilamowitz followed, correctly pointed out that the reading φθώνος is the result of a mistake made by someone (a scribe, or ancient critic) who wrongly thought that Μάμος and Φθώνος were one and the same: if Μάμος "were just another name for Φθώνος"\(^7\), of course it would be necessary to read φθόρος, in line 113. Μάμος and Φθώνος are of course constantly associated with each other in ancient texts: this is why the scribe or critic who created the reading φθόρος in line 113 mistakenly thought that Φθώνος, in Callimachus' line under discussion, was merely another name for Μάμος. The same mistake was made, as we have seen, by Spanhem, and was repeated by modern scholars such as Kambylis (Blomquist, *loc. cit.*). In reality, as Schneider, Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl and others have shown, Μάμος and Φθώνος are not to be identified with each other, because they are the personifications of the two entirely different concepts. Wilamowitz' distinction between Μάμος and Φθώνος is regarded as "basically sound" by certain critics (cf. Williams, p. 97). Blomquist, Köhnken and others (cf. Blomquist, pp. 19-22) reject the type of distinction made by Wilamowitz between Μάμος and Φθώνος, but the important, indeed crucial, point, which Blomquist of course cannot avoid accepting, is that ancient texts

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6 Cf. Williams, *loc. cit.*, for details concerning Wilamowitz, Von der Mühl, etc.
(Agatharchides, Pindar, Bacchylides, Plutarch, Gregory, etc.) show that a clear difference existed between Μώμος and Φθόνος, as Schneider (Callimachea, I, 194) was the first to underline: Φθόνος, Envy, is the cause of Μώμος, which latter can be best translated as “Tadelsucht”, “Blame” (see the acute observations made by Meillier, art. cit., 78). In other words: in antiquity, the relationship between Φθόνος and Μώμος was supposed to be “one of cause and effect” (Blomquist, art. cit., 22). That is to say: Envy, i. e. Φθόνος, causes envious people to produce that “Blame”, i. e. Μώμος. In other words: Μώμος is the effect, the result of Φθόνος.

In the light of the crucial point just mentioned, the conclusion reached by Blomquist is mistaken. His objection to the reading Φθόνος, in line 113, is that this word would produce a “circular expression”, because, according to him, the sense of the phrase ὁ δὲ Μώμος, ἵνα Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοτο will be “may my critics go where my critics are”. Having reached the conclusion that the variant Φθόνος would produce a “circular expression” — a conclusion which we shall see is entirely wrong—Blomquist sees himself compelled to accept, faute de mieux, the reading Φθόρος, because this latter makes sense, whereas the reading Φθόνος, according to him, does not, insofar as it produces, as he believes, “a circular expression” which is “muddle-headed”. In Blomquist’s opinion, the variant Φθόρος produces the meaning “may my critics turn silent” (art. cit., 23), and indicates that Callimachus tells Φθόνος and “its representative Μώμος, i. e. his critics, simply to go to hell” (art. cit., 19).

Both these contentions made by Blomquist are erroneous. First of all, the reading Φθόνος produces a sense which is the opposite of a “circular expression”, and which is in reality adroitly pointed and admirably cogent. Μώμος and Φθόνος, in line 113, do not both mean “my critics”, as Blomquist asserts. Already Cahen has underlined that Callimachus, by writing ὁ δὲ Μώμος, ἵνα Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοτο, makes a “distinction subtile” between “Critique” (Μώμος) and “Envie” (Φθόνος). According to Cahen, this “distinction” made by Callimachus “brode sur une assertion platonicienne”, i. e. rests on Phdr. 247 A, a passage already quoted in this connection by Schneider (Callimachea I, 194). In reality, as we shall see, the passage of Plato in question is not directly relevant to the distinction between Μώμος and Φθόνος which Callimachus makes here, although it is relevant to Callimachus’ argument to the effect that his poetry is valid.

In order to understand the sense not only of line 113, but also of the whole conclusion offered by the Hymn in its lines 105-113, it is necessary to examine

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8 Μώμος was "tadelsüchtig", because he was motivated by Φθόνος (Babrius 59, 1-18 Perry), and on account of his "Tadelsucht" (i. e. his desire to criticize what in reality does not deserve to be criticized) was punished by Zeus (Roscher, Lex. Mythol., s. v. Momos, 3119): Zeus ejected him from Olympus, by way of punishment, because he unjustifiably criticized gods and goddesses, as we read in Aesop, 155 Hausr.=155 Halm, 100 Schn.: καὶ ὁ Ζεύς, ἄγανακτήσας κατ’ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ, τοῦ "Οὐλίμπου αὐτῶν ἔξεβαλεν.

9 Les Hymnes de Callimaque (Paris 1930) 88.
the said conclusion within the framework of Callimachus' own "Poëtik" - a task which neither Meillier nor Blomquist has carried out. The fundamental principles of Callimachus' "Poëtik", as I have shown elsewhere in every possible detail, are two: these two principles are enunciated by the poet, in an exactly parallel manner, in *Epigr. 21* Pf., *Aitia* fr. 1.1 Pf., and in the conclusion of the *Hymn to Apollo*. The said principles are: a) Callimachus' poetry is valid, because it is approved of by the deities presiding over poetry, i.e. Apollo and the Muses; b) the criticism levelled at Callimachus' poetry by his rivals is not valid, because, instead of being objective, it is caused by envy. In *Epigr. 21* Pf. Callimachus asserts that his poetry is valid, by calling to witness the fact that it is approved of by the Muses: the Muses, by approving of Callimachus' poetry and by protecting him insofar as he is a valid poet, have enabled him to triumph over the *Baškavnía*, Envy, nurtured against him by his rivals. In *Aitia 1.1* Pf. Callimachus makes two assertions. First: his poetry is valid, witness the fact that Apollo (lines 21 ff.) and the Muses (lines 37 ff.) approve of it and support him as a poet. Second: the criticism brought against him by his rivals is not valid, because his rivals are the progeny of Envy (lines 17 ff.: *Baškavnías óloōn γένος*), i.e. they are motivated by Envy. His rivals are not only motivated by Envy, *Baškavnía*, and therefore unable to judge Callimachus' poetry impartially and objectively: they are, moreover, incompetent in matters of poetry, because they are equated by Callimachus with the *Telχíves*, malevolent *daimônes* (not gods), devoted to carping criticism, who, precisely because they are mere *daimônes*, cannot possibly be a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself. Callimachus invites his rivals, therefore, to overcome their incompetence concerning poetry, and to learn how to judge poetry by using the aesthetic canons promulgated by Apollo and followed, upon Apollo's instructions, by Callimachus (lines 17 ff. *ἀδήδι δὲ τέχνη κρίνετε, κτλ.*).

In sum: the criticism levelled at Callimachus by his rivals is said, in *Aitia 1.1* Pf., to be doubly invalid, in that his rivals are motivated by envy and they are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo, who supports Callimachus. Exactly the same principles preached by Callimachus in *Aitia 1.1* Pf. are applied by him in the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo. Callimachus asserts that he has, thanks to the help of Apollo, who approves of Callimachus' poetry, triumphed over the envy which motivates his rivals: Apollo kicks *Φθόνος* away, and refutes him (*Hymn. Ap. 105* ff.). In other words: The criticism aimed at Callimachus by his rivals is doubly invalid, because it is motivated by envy, *Φθόνος*, and because the god of poetry supports Callimachus. The presence of *Μώμος* alongside *Φθόνος* in line 113 of the Hymn is demonstrated to be necessary by the overt parallelism with *Aitia*, fr. 1.1 Pf. Callimachus attacks not only the cause of the unfair criticism pointed at him, i.e. Envy (*Baškavnía Aitia 1.1.17=Φθόνος Hymn. Ap. 105* ff.), but al-

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so the unfair critics themselves. These critics are said to be the “progeny of Envy” (Aitia 1.1.17: Ἀπολλόνις ὁλὸν γένος: they are, that is, generated by, i.e. the effect of, Envy) and are equated with the malevolent non-gods called θελχινες (Aitia 1.1.7), just as the said critics are equated with the malevolent non-god called Μῶμος in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo. Since, in antiquity, the relationship between θελχινες and Μῶμος was known to be one of cause and effect, as Blomquist himself says (art. cit., 22), it follows that Μῶμος, personifying Callimachus’ critics in Hymn. Ap. 113, is denounced by the poet as the effect of Envy. In sum: the malevolent non-gods θελχινες (in Aitia, fr. 1.1) and Μῶμος (Hymn. Ap., 113), who personify his critics, are denounced by Callimachus as the product of Envy. Insofar as his critics are motivated by Envy, and therefore not fair, their judgement -this is the basis of Callimachus’ argument- is not valid.

Not only are the θελχινες, insofar as motivated by Envy, incapable of judging poetry impartially: they are, for good measure, incompetent in matters of poetry, as I have already underlined. They are not a match for the god of poetry, Apollo himself: this is why Callimachus exhorts them to overcome their incompetence by learning to judge poetry according to the canons which Apollo had issued and which Callimachus followed. In lines 17 ff. of Aitia 1.1, Callimachus writes:

έλλατε, Βασκανίνης ὁλὸν γένος· ἀθανάτη δὲ τέχνη
κρίνετε, μὴ σχολήν περαιών, τὴν σοφίνμεν
μηδ' ἀπ' ἐμεῖν διφατέ μέγα φωσφόρον αὐτήν
τίκτεσθαι· βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμὸν, ἀλλὰ Διὸς.

The sense is: “come now (έλλατε), you baneful race of Jealousy! Hereafter (ἀθανάτη) judge poetry by the canons of art...” The adverb ἀθανάτη, “hereafter”, means “now that you have heard from me the correct canons of art”. The structure of the Hymn is very clear: Callimachus first enunciates the correct canons of art (lines 7 ff.), then exhorts the θελχινες to follow these canons after they have heard them from him (ἀθανάτη), and finally explains why such canons are correct: they are correct because (lines 21 ff.) they were issued to Callimachus by none other than Apollo, the god of poetry (lines 21 ff.: καὶ γὰρ ὅτε κ.τ.λ.). Since Eustathius quotes Callimachus as having written ἐλλετε Βασκανίνης ὁλὸν γένος, certain critics wanted to supplement ἐλλετε Βασκανίνης in the papyrus fragment of Aitia 1.1.17. The word ἐλλετε was explained by Eustathius as being equivalent to ἔρρετε, “abite in malam rem”, but such a word presented two difficulties. First of all, the equivalence of ἐλλετε and ἔρρετε is phonetically impossible to explain, as was already pointed out by Ahrens (material in Schneider, Callimachea II, 513, fr. 292). Secondly: if Callimachus, in fr. 292=Aitia 1.1, line 17, had written ἐλλετε, a word equivalent to ἔρρετε and meaning “abite in malam rem”, i.e. “drop dead”, such a word would be contextually impossible, because Callimachus, in the passage under discussion, exhorts the θελχινες to do something, i.e. to judge poetry correctly (κρίνετε...μηδὲ...διφάτε...): dead people cannot do anything. Therefore
it was suggested that the correct word was ἐλλατε, which we find, in fact, attested in Callim. Aitia fr. 1.7.13 Pf.=fr. 121 Schn. The form ἐλλατε, in Callim. Aitia fr. 1.7.13 Pf., is followed by an imperative (ἐνυψήσαθε), and means "come now" (so, correctly, Trypanis, in his Loeb edition of Callimachus), "agedum". The scholiast on Aitia, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., now confirms that Callimachus, in Aitia fr. 1.1.17 Pf. wrote precisely ἐλλατε: the word ἐλλατε is followed by imperatives (κρίνετε restored by the editors in line 18, and μηδὲ...διφάτε, restored in line 19). In other words: in Aitia, fr. 1.1.17 Pf., Callimachus wrote ἐλλατε, which means "agedum", "come now". The reading ἐλλετε, in Callim. fr. 292 Schn., was evidently invented by some late grammarian who could not explain the form ἐλλατε etymologically (its etymology is debated to this day), and imagined that ἐλλετε could be equivalent to ἔρρετε. We shall now see that, just as the non-gods Τελχίνες are said by Callimachus to be incompetent in judging matters of poetry, because they are no match for the god of poetry himself, Apollo, as is Μώμος (the malevolent non-god who personifies, in Hymn. Ap. 113, the rivals of Callimachus just as the Τελχίνες personify the same rivals in Ait. 1.1 Pf.) said by Callimachus to be no match for Apollo, and therefore to be incompetent in judging poetry. What is the exact meaning of the phrase ὅς ὁ Μώμος, ἐν τῷ Θόνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο? Williams thinks that it is an ἀποπομπῇ or ἐπιπομπῇ (op. cit., 97). According to him, line 113 means that Callimachus invited Θόνος and Μώμος to attack "each other". Williams' hypothesis is not tenable, because both the ἀποπομπῇ and the ἐπιπομπῇ were prayers whereby a human invited one deity to attack persons other than the suppliant. As far as I know, neither in the ἀποπομπῇ nor in the ἐπιπομπῇ were two deities invited to attack each other, and in fact in the ἀποπομπῇ written by Leonidas, which Williams uses as the basis of his contention, Μώμος is invited by Leonidas to attack other human beings, not to attack any other deity.

The correct answer to the question which I have asked, i. e. the question as to the precise meaning of the phrase ὅς ὁ Μώμος, ἐν τῷ Θόνος, ἐνθα νέοιτο, can be arrived at if we establish where Θόνος and Μώμος were supposed to dwell. Θόνος (Roscher, Lex. Mythol. s. v. Phthonos, 2474) was a would-be god who as such wanted to live in Heaven (οὐρανός, Orph. Hymn. 64.5 Quandt), whence he was constantly ejected by the real gods. Zeus (Plato, Phdr. 297 A) ejected him, and the same was done by the god Νόμος and the goddess Νέμεσις (material in Quandt, Hymn. Orph. 64.5, where it is underlined that Callimachus' ἡλασεν in Hymn. Ap. 107 corresponds exactly to ἐλαύνεις in Hymn. Orph. 64.5 and ἐλαύνει in Mesomed. 10.6). The present forms ἐλαύνεις and ἐλαύνει show that, when Zeus ejected Θόνος from the circle of the gods, Θόνος did not resign himself to his fate, and constantly tried to return amongst the gods, only to be kicked out of their circle again; Callimachus' λάθριος in Hymn. Ap. 105 underlines that Θόνος tried furtively to remain within the circle of the gods. Μώμος was another would-be deity (Roscher s. v. Momos, 3119), who, exactly like Θόνος, was ejected by Zeus from "Ολυμπός ("aus dem Olympia verbannt") be-
cause of his “Tadelsucht” (Aesop. 155 Hausr.). In Artemidorus 4 Prooim. p. 307, as quoted in Roscher (loc. cit.), we read ᾗν δὲ τίς ἄρα ἐν ἀνθρώποις Μῶιος ἀπελελαμένος θεών καὶ δαιμόνων οὐκ ἄγαθος. It will be noted that Artemidorus’ ἀπελελαμένος corresponds exactly to Callimachus’ ἡλασεν, in Hymn. Ap. 107. Callimachus’ final line of his Hymn to Apollo ὅ δὲ Μῶιος, ἐν ὧν Φθόνος, ἐνθα νέολτο, meaning as it does “may Μῶιος return where Φθόνος dwells” signifies that Μῶιος cannot aspire any more than Φθόνος to be considered a god inhabiting Olympus like the god of poetry, i. e. Apollo: Μῶιος, that is, is not a match for Apollo in judging poetry, and is just as incompetent to judge Callimachus’ poetry as the Τελχίνες are. Cahen’ translation (Les Hymnes de Callimaque, Paris 1930, 281) is correct: “que Μῶιος aille rejoindre Φθόνος là précisément où l’ a précipité le coup de pied d’ Apollon”. It is only necessary to add that “là précisément”, as I have shown, means “away from the circle of the gods”, in the sense that neither Φθόνος nor Μῶιος can aspire to be competent judges of poetry, such as real gods like Apollo and the Muses are.

The reading Φθόνος, in line 113, is, we may conclude, genuine: its presence in the line, far from creating a “circular expression”, as Blomquist states, renders Callimachus’ argumentation cogent and exactly parallel to the argumentation employed by Callimachus in the Aitia: both Μῶιος and Φθόνος do not dwell in Olympus, do not belong to the circle of real gods, and as such cannot be a match, when it comes to judging poetry, for real gods such as Apollo and the Muses, who preside over poetry.

The reading Φθόνος, on the other hand, was created by someone who did not understand that Callimachus distinguishes between Φθόνος and Μῶιος: Μῶιος; that is, the personification of his critics, and is the effect of Φθόνος, insofar as Callimachus’ critics are the progeny of Envy, i. e. are motivated by Envy. The reading Φθόνος produces a “platitudine”, as Cahen (loc. cit.) already noted. For Callimachus to send his critics “tout simplement à la male heure” (Cahen, loc. cit.) -this is the meaning which line 113 has, if we accept the reading Φθόνος- would not constitute an argumentation capable of demonstrating that Callimachus’ critics are incompetent to judge poetry: it would be a mere platitude, without any cogen- cency. Things would be worse if we accept the reading Φθόνος and understood the line to mean “may my critics turn silent”, as Blomquist suggests. Callimachus’ critics had already spoken (Hymn. Ap. 105-106, Aitia 1.1.1 ff.): since they have already spoken, Callimachus want them not to become silent -their becoming silent after publicly criticizing Callimachus’ poetry would not undo the damage they have done to Callimachus’ reputation as a poet: what Callimachus wants them to do is not to become now silent -their silence would not cancel what they have said against Callimachus- but, logically enough, to recant and admit that Callimachus’

11 The verb ἔλαίνω, in Orph. Hymn. 64.5, Mesomed. 10.6 and Callim. Hymn. Apoll. 107 means "verjagen", "eject" (Roscher s. v. Phthonos, 2474).
poetry is valid. That retraction, not silence on the part of his critics is what Callimachus wants is demonstrated not only by logic, but also by Callimachus' own words: in Aitia 1.1.17 ff. he calls upon his critics to learn how to properly judge his poetry 12, not to be silent.

Conclusion: if we examine line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo according both to logic and to Callimachus' own statements regarding his poetry which are contained in the Aitia and in Epigr. 21 Pf., the criterion called utrum in alterum or lectio difficilior demonstrates that the reading Φθόνος is genuine, whereas the variant φθόρος is a trivialization produced by someone who did not understand the distinction made by Callimachus between Μώμος and Φθόνος and who, by introducing φθόρος into the place of the genuine reading Φθόνος, created a platitude.

For the convenience of the readers, I might as well summarize our results. Callimachus distinguishes sharply between Envy (Βασκανία, Φθόνος) and his critics, who were motivated by Envy. In Aitia 1.1, he distinguishes between Βασκανία, over which he triumphed thanks to the protection of the Muses (Aitia 1.1.37 ff.; the same motif is in Epigr. 21 Pf.: cf. Scr. Min. Alex. I, 246 ff.) and his critics, who, personified as the Τελχίνες (malevolent δαίμονες, not real gods) are said by him to be the progeny, the product of Βασκανία (Βασκανίτης ὀλον γένος: Ait. 1.1.17). In the conclusion of the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus distinguishes, in line 113, between Envy (Φθόνος over whom he triumphs thanks to the support of Apollo: lines 105 ff.) and his critics, personified by Μώμος, a malevolent would-be god who was regarded, in antiquity, to be the product, the effect, the progeny of Φθόνος.

The parallelism of Callimachus’ triumph over the Τελχίνες and over Μώμος is just as elegant as it is complete. In Aitia 1.1.17 ff. the Τελχίνες are invited by Callimachus, insofar as they were known to be mere δαίμονες and not real gods, to learn how to correctly judge poetry according to the canons established by no less an authority than the god of poetry, Apollo, and adhered to by Callimachus. In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphs over Μώμος no less elegantly and completely. It was known in antiquity (Plato, Phdr. 247 A) that Φθόνος εξω θείου χρόου ἵσταται: that is to say, Φθόνος, who was a mere “Dămon” (RE, s. v. “Phthonos”, for details), tried to usurp a position amongst the gods, but they (Zeus, Nomos, Nemesis) kicked him away from their χορός, their circle. In the Hymn to Apollo, Φθόνος tries to usurp a position within the χορός of the gods, in that he tries to enunciate his own canons for judging poetry, which were contrary to those promulgated by the god of poetry, i. e. Apollo: but Apollo ejects Φθόνος from such a usurped position (cf. Herter, RE, Supplem. V, s. v. “Callimachos”, 440), by kicking him away (Hymn. Ap. 107). Μώμος, by trying to criticize Callimachus’ poetry, acted as Φθόνος did in the Hymn to Apollo, i. e. he tried to

12 The adverb αἱρή “hereafter” which qualifies κρίνετε in Ait. 1.1.17 f. makes it clear that Callimachus expects his critics to retract their previous judgement of his poetry.
usurp a position as a peer amongst the gods, in that he, Μῶμος, wanted to oppose his own judgement concerning poetry to the poetic rules issued by the god of poetry himself, Apollo, but Callimachus tells Μῶμος to abandon such a usurped position and to return where Μῶμος really belongs, i.e. to the same place where Φθόνος belongs, that is to say, outside the circle of the gods. It was well known, in antiquity, as we have observed, that both Φθόνος and Μῶμος had been ejected from the ranks of the gods, whence it follows that neither Φθόνος nor Μῶμος can aspire to be a peer of Apollo, which latter, in his capacity as the god of poetry, approves of the poetry written by Callimachus.

Callimachus explicitly tells Μῶμος, in line 113 of the Hymn to Apollo, to dwell precisely where Φθόνος resides: since both Μῶμος and Φθόνος dwelled, according to ancient authors, outside the circle of the gods, Callimachus' "allusion" to such authors (an allusion which Williams, op. cit., 97, a priori excludes, without explaining why) could no be more overt. Such an allusion, as I hope to have demonstrated, throws full light on the meaning of line 113 of the Hymn.

In the light of what I have written Blomquist' error will, I trust, have become clear. He believes (art. cit., 23) that the reading Φθόνος, in line 113, would produce a "circular expression", i.e. the sense "may my critics (Μῶμος) go where my critics (Φθόνος) are", because Φθόνος, in Callimachus' Hymn to Apollo, motivates no other critics than those who are, in line 113, personified by Μῶμος. But Blomquist has overlooked the fact that, according to the ancient way of thinking, Φθόνος and Βασκανία were real mythological beings (no less real than Apollo and the Muses), who were distinct from the humans motivated by Φθόνος or Βασκανία. I have explained all this in Scr. Min. Alex. I, 235 ff. Callimachus' triumph is, in his Hymn to Apollo, a double one, as it is a double one in Aitia 1.1. In the Hymn to Apollo, Callimachus triumphed, with the help of Apollo, over personified Φθόνος (lines 107 ff.), who motivated his critics, and over his critics, i.e. over Μῶμος, in Aitia 1.1, Callimachus triumphed over his critics, i.e. the Τελχίνες, who were motivated by personified Βασκανία (βασκανίης ὁλόν γένος, lines 17 ff.) and over personified Βασκανία, who rendered the Τελχίνες destructive: Βασκανία, the personified "Kraft" (Scr. Min. Alex. I, 245) who animated the Τελχίνες, could be defeated, as Callimachus makes it clear in Epigr. 21 Pf., lines 4-6, and in Aitia 1.1.37 f., by Callimachus only with the help of the Muses' benevolent eye (Scr. Min. Alex. I, 245-250).

13 In other words: Blomquist does not seem to have understand that personifications of abstract concepts (his art., 19), i.e. "Personifikationen abstrakter Begriffe", to use Roscher's terminology (Roscher, s. v. "Personifikationen") were envisaged by the ancients as animated beings, living persons.